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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit handed down several important decisions in the field of
environmental law between September 1994 and September 1995.' This Sur-
vey focuses on two substantial decisions on environmental law issues. The
first case, United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad,2 discussed the com-
plex, and as yet unsettled, distinction between cost recovery and contribution
as governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980.? Secondly, Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v.
Browner,' a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, treated the issue of
pre-enforcement judicial review of a Clean Water Act (CWA)5 compliance
order issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).6
Part I of this Survey discusses the Colorado & Eastern decision in light
of the statutory and case law that preceded it. Part II examines Laguna
Gatuna. Finally, this Survey argues that these two decisions have affected
environmental law inconsistently, even though both case opinions attempt to
follow congressional intent. On the one hand, the Tenth Circuit eroded the
structure of CERCLA with its holding in Colorado & Eastern, and created
substantial legal uncertainty in future cost recovery and contribution actions.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit's holding in Laguna Gatuna provides
needed legal certainty by barring pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA
compliance orders under the CWA.
1. Other Tenth Circuit decisions in the survey period relating to environmental law but not
discussed include: Leadville Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 55 F.3d 537 (10th Cir.
1995) (affirming dismissal of an indemnity claim for failure to abide by notice provisions of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) liability
insurance policy); Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522 (10th
Cir. 1995) (interpreting a pollution exclusion clause); Pueblo of Scandia v. United States, 50 F.3d
856 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing and remanding summary judgment against a Native American
claim for bad faith failure to preserve Forest Service land used for cultural and religious purposes
as required by the National Historic Preservation Act); Red Panther Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 43 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994) (resolving an interpretation dispute regarding an insurance
policy excluding pollution); Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-
versing dismissal of a federal whistleblowing claim stemming from the FBI investigation of the
Rocky Flats Superfund site in Colorado).
2. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
4. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
6. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 564.
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I. COST RECOVERY VS. CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA:




CERCLA is arguably one of the most significant environmental statutes in
existence Its comprehensive structure allows the federal government to take
control of an environmentally dangerous site; clean it or require the potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) to clean it; and, under CERCLA's cost recovery
provisions, hold each PRP responsible for the cleanup costs.9 Under both
court-imposed and statutory joint and several liability,0° a party may be held
liable in a cost recovery action for the full cost of a site's remediation, regard-
less of the party's culpability or the amount of contamination the party actual-
ly contributed."
In 1986, Congress added the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) 2 to CERCLA. These new provisions codified a remedy which
already had been made available to PRPs by the courts: a fight to contribution
from other PRPs for a completed cleanup. 3 Furthermore, SARA also provid-
ed a "contribution bar" for PRPs that settle with the EPA, at least for the
"matters addressed" in their consent decree.'4 As a result, CERCLA's com-
plex and controversial structure juxtaposed two extremes: protection contribu-
tion from claims for settlors and joint and several liability for nonsettlors.
These sharply contrasting options provide substantial incentive for PRPs to
7. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. See Michael V. Sucaet, Contribution Protection Under CERCLA: What Have You Settled
and Not Settled?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9), 9607(a) (1994); Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1479; Gregory J. Walch,
Note, Burlington Northern Railroad v. Time Oil: Contribution Protection Under the 1986
Superfund Amendments, 22 ENVTL. L. 757, 758 (1992).
10. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535. For a sampling of various court interpretations of
joint and several liability under CERCLA, see County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508,
1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under
CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 299 (1995). For a discussion of statutorily imposed joint and
several liability, see Sucaet. supra note 8, at 1481-83.
11. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535; Allen Samelson, "Whose Liability Is This Any-
way?": The Allowability of Environmental Clean-up Costs Potentially Attributable to Other Re-
sponsible Parties, 24 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 293, 304 (1995).
12. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)); see
Karen L. DeMeo, Note, Is CERCLA Working? An Analysis of the Settlement and Contribution
Provisions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493, 494-95 (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. Courts were concerned about the inequity of holding a single defen-
dant liable for the cost of an entire site cleanup with no way to recoup expenditures from other
PRPs. Id. Courts therefore implied a right of contribution between PRPs in CERCLA cases before
Congress actually codified the right in SARA. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535.
14. SARA states, "A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in
an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (emphasis added). A con-
sent decree is a cleanup agreement entered in a federal district court settling remedial action issues
with the PRP. Id. § 9622(d)(1)(A)-(C).
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settle with the EPA as early as possible in the overall cleanup process. 5 By
entering into a protective consent decree with the EPA quickly, a PRP can
indemnify itself from further liability. 6 Absent a settlement, a PRP may find
itself financially responsible for all costs of cleanup which are uncollected or
uncollectible by the EPA. 7
The distinction between cost recovery and contribution is complex.'
Cost recovery actions reimburse those who cleanup a CERCLA site for costs
associated with the cleanup.' 9 Courts hold defendants in cost recovery suits
jointly, severally, and strictly liable. ° Contribution actions, however, appor-
tion liability between guilty parties.2' Defendants subject to joint and several
liable may, in contribution actions, invoke defenses such as equity and divisi-
bility to divert some or all of their liability. 22 Additionally, the statute of limi-
tations differs for each action.23
15. DeMeo, supra note 12, at 500-03; Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1484-85.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(d)(1)(A)-(C).
17. Id.; see also Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1484-86.
18. For examples of cases in which courts have addressed the differences between two meth-
ods of recovery, see United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761
(7th Cir. 1994); County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d 1508; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck
Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
19. Section 9607(a)(4)(B) provides the statutory basis for cost recovery by a party that has
already financially contributed to a cleanup. It states that another PRP shall be liable for "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (em-
phasis added); see also General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415
(8th Cir. 1990) (addressing the ability of appellants to obtain cost recovery), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
937 (1991); Walch, supra note 9, at 758. Under § 9607, the EPA can initiate a cleanup and then
seek recovery from a later-identified PRP. Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1479.
20. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535. A PRP liable in a cost recovery action can, on its
own initiative, find and sue other PRPs under a contribution theory to recoup any portion of the
cleanup costs that it alleges were another PRP's responsibility. Id. A cost recovery action is riskier
for a PRP than a contribution action, because cost recovery is a matter of strict liability. Id. If
other PRPs have settled and properly worded their consent decrees, a PRP may not be able to
recover from them. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0; Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1536.
22. Oswald, supra note 10, at 334-42. CERCLA's contribution provisions instruct that "the
court may allocate response costs among the liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). The Tenth Circuit has pointed to the use of
the "Gore Factors" proposed by Senator Albert Gore as a moderate approach. Colorado & East-
ern, 50 F.3d at 1536 n.5. The Gore Factors are:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release
or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished; (ii) the amount of the hazardous
waste involved; (iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; (iv) the
degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage,
or disposal of the hazardous waste; (v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with
respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such
hazardous waste; and (vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with the Federal,
State or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id. (quoting Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir.
1992)). On the other hand, the Second Restatement of Torts offers a bright-line test allowing ap-
portionment only when a court may adequately determine the divisibility of the harm. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3). Parties have six years in which to file a cost recovery action
but only three years to file a contribution action. Id.
19961
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2. Case Law Background
Since CERCLA's enactment, courts have struggled with interpreting and
applying it. Specifically, courts approach the cost recovery and contribution
provisions of CERCLA inconsistently.24 Some courts have held that only in-
nocent parties may sue under a theory of cost recovery, limiting lawsuits be-
tween PRPs to contribution actions. 2 Other courts, however, have held that
any party that actually cleaned up a private or governmental site may bring a
cost recovery action against a PRP.26 Under this approach, PRPs not partici-
pating in a site's cleanup may only pursue contribution actions against other
PRPs." Most courts agree, however, that consent decrees may bar subse-
quent contribution actions against the settling party, depending on the factual
situation.2" Courts consider a consent decree's wording29 as well as other
factors3" in determining which "matters" it "addresses."'"
B. United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad32
1. Facts
The Colorado & Eastern Railroad Company (CERC), its holding compa-
ny, and its former president and sole shareholder (collectively "the CERC par-
ties") owned land purchased from Farmland Industries.33 Both the CERC
parties and Farmland bought the land after substantial initial contamination had
occurred.34 Upon discovering the contamination and performing a remedial
24. DeMeo, supra note 12, at 496; Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1489; Walch, supra note 9, at
760.
25. For examples of cases in which PRPs were limited to contribution actions, see United
Technologies Corp. 33 F.3d at 101-03; Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 763; County Line Inv. Co.,
933 F.2d at 1515-17; General Elec. Co., 920 F.2d at 1417-21.
26. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 814 F. Supp. at 1277.
27. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 103.
28. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 766; DeMeo, supra note 12, at 512-17; Sucaet, supra
note 8, at 1492-99; Walch, supra note 9, at 759-61.
29. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 765 ("Our starting point, naturally, is the consent decree
itself."); Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1490-91.
30. Courts are inconsistent in both their delineation of these factors and in an overall con-
ceptual approach to their determination:
Other courts have suggested that the 'matters addressed' by a consent decree be deter-
mined with reference to the particular location, time frame, hazardous substances, and
clean-up costs covered by the agreement .... [But] this [list] should not be treated as
an exhaustive list of appropriate considerations, for the relevance of each factor will
vary with the facts of the case.
Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 766 (citations omitted). The statute is silent on how we are to de-
termine what particular "matters" a consent decree addresses. Some courts have used balancing
tests. "Other courts have concluded that [the contribution bar provision] was intended to encourage
settlement while providing settling PRPs with a measure of finality in return for their willingness
to settle." Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1537 (citations omitted). The court later noted that it
was taking "a fact-specific approach." Id. at 1538; see also Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1493-94 (ex-
plaining that courts have used "fact driven test[s]," "flexible and fact based approach[es]," and
tests involving "equitable apportionment of costs").
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
32. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
33. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1532-33.
34. Id. at 1532. Both pesticides and metals were found in the soil at the site. Id.
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investigation and feasibility study, the EPA sued Farmland, the CERC parties,
and other PRPs for response costs and future cleanup costs.35 Farmland and
another party, McKesson Corporation, entered into a consent decree with the
EPA, in which they agreed to pay $700,000 and clean the entire site-includ-
ing the CERC parties' land.36
Farmland and McKesson cleaned up the site at a total cost of over $15
million.3 Two months before completion of the cleanup, the CERC parties
entered into a consent decree with the EPA, paying $100,000 to the EPA and
acquiring absolution of further liability to the EPA.3" The CERC parties later
defaulted on their consent decree with the EPA.39
Farmland alleged that almost $1.5 million of its cleanup costs were a
direct result of the CERC parties' actions and cross-claimed in the EPA action
under a theory of cost recovery.' The district court awarded Farmland over
$734,000.4'
2. Decision
The CERC parties appealed the district court's decision, which was based
on a cost recovery theory.42 The Tenth Circuit held that actions between
PRPs are claims for contribution and not for cost recovery, regardless of how
they are worded.43 The court found enough validity in Farmland's claim for
contribution to survive summary judgment and therefore remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with a contribution action."
C. Analysis
The Colorado & Eastern court based its holding on two primary issues:
cost recovery versus contribution, and indemnification due to matters ad-
dressed in the consent decree.45 The facial distinction between what consti-
tutes a cost recovery claim as compared to a contribution claim under
CERCLA can be easily determined. Courts find it more difficult to articulate
who may use which claim, and the degree to which causation may enter into
each theory is even more difficult to articulate, and, unfortunately, courts have
not provided a consistent answer.'
The Colorado & Eastern court attempted to explain clearly the difference
between a cost recovery action and a contribution action.47 Specifically, it











46. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
47. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535.
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sought to identify which types of parties could recover under each action."
First, citing one of its own cases and several cases from other jurisdictions, the
Tenth Circuit established that cost recovery actions are governed by both strict
liability and joint and several liability. 9 Then, after analyzing the contribution
provisions of CERCLA, the court concluded that "any claim that would reap-
portion costs between [PRPs] is the quintessential claim for contribution. 50
Finally, noting that Farmland sought reapportionment, the court limited Farm-
land to a contribution action, and further stated that the district court's allow-
ance of a cost recovery claim under the facts of the case constituted error."'
The second major issue the court addressed was the CERC parties' claim
of immunity as a result of its judicially approved consent decree with the
EPA. 2 A consent decree indemnifies a PRP from contribution actions only if
the consent decree expressly addresses matters forming the basis of the contri-
bution actions. 3 In determining what constitutes such a "matter addressed,"
the court noted that some courts use balancing tests and that others use settle-
ment incentives.54 Taking a "fact-specific approach," the court concluded that
Farmland could not have expected contribution indemnification because of the
late execution of the CERC parties' consent decree and the relatively small
settlement involved.5 The CERC parties could have specifically placed lan-
guage in the decree providing indemnification, but as they failed to do so, they
must pay their share of the cleanup costs.56 Furthermore, the CERC parties'
default on the consent decree through nonpayment did not affect CERCLA's
contribution protections. 7
Ultimately, based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that any
action for reapportionment of costs between PRPs constitutes a contribution
action.5" Additionally, the court held that a judicially approved consent decree
will not automatically indemnify the settlor unless it specifically includes
indemnification. 9
D. Other Circuits
Ironically, the various attempts made by other circuits to uphold and en-
force CERCLA have undermined the statute's effectiveness. Though many
district courts have ruled on these issues,' ° decisions by the two circuits that
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Farmland Indus. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain, 987 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1993);
County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d at 1508; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 802).
50. Id. at 1536.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1537.
54. Id. For a discussion of the various factors that courts employ, see supra note 30.
55. See Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1538.
56. See id. at 1537-38.
57. Id. at 1538.
58. Id. at 1539.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., United States v. SCA Serv., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 533, 546 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(holding that hazardous waste site owner who cleaned up site pursuant to consent decree had
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have taken a stance fail to paint a complete picture. In United Technologies
Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries,61 the court relied on the canons of statu-
tory construction, legislative intent, and statutory history to limit only PRPs to
contribution actions.62 In the First Circuit, therefore, both the EPA and inno-
cent parties may bring cost recovery actions for their respective response
costs. All other claims must be for contribution among the guilty parties.
Similarly, in Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,63 the Seventh Circuit
held that any suit between PRPs must be based on contribution.' In deciding
whether the consent decree barred the action in that case, the court referred to
"both the reasonable expectations of the signatories and the equitable appor-
tionment of costs."
Thus, though not fully settled, the views of both the First and Seventh
Circuits are on par with those of the Tenth. The trend indicates that courts will
limit all PRPs to contribution actions to recover their costs. Furthermore, the
EPA will always possess the power to use CERCLA's cost recovery provi-
sions to recoup costs of site cleanup. In the First Circuit, innocent parties who
clean up a site may also sue under the cost recovery provision.' In the re-
maining circuits, whether or not such an innocent actor may maintain a cost
recovery action remains unclear.
The additional "matters addressed" controversy surrounding settlement
serves to intensify an already complex conceptual conundrum. 67 Though the
Tenth Circuit seems firm in its stance toward barring contribution actions via
express provisions in consent decrees, other circuits employ various, somewhat
more nebulous approaches.' Furthermore, because the statute of limitations
differs for each action, a party who has missed the deadline for a contribution
pursued a cost recovery as opposed to contribution action); General Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials,
Inc., 826 F. Supp. 471, 478 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (stating that a consent decree did not bar contribu-
tion action against signatory under the facts presented therein); Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
825 F. Supp. 1132, 1138 (D. R.I. 1992) (holding that de minimus settlors were not subject to
contribution actions by other PRPs); United States v. Asarco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 957 (D.
Colo. 1993) (holding that contribution provision in consent decree absolving party of liability to
government barred contribution action by another codefendant); Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic
Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1090 (D. N.J. 1992) (stating that settlement with government for its
costs did not bar actions for contribution), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2692 (1994); United States v. Alexander, 771 F. Supp. 830, 841 (S.D. Tex. 1991),
vacated, 981 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that de minimus settlors were not subject to
contribution actions and that Rule 11 sanctions could be leveled against parties who brought con-
tribution actions against them).
61. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
62. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 99-100.
63. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 764-65.
65. Id. at 766.
66. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 96.
67. In fact, just filing a CERCLA contribution action in some jurisdictions could be consid-
ered dangerous. At least two district courts have sanctioned or threatened to sanction PRPs under
FED. R. Civ. P. II for filing contribution actions against settling parties. See Avnet, 825 F. Supp.
at 1142-43; Alexander, 771 F. Supp. at 841; DeMeo, supra note 12, at 525 n.155.
68. For a discussion of the various approaches taken by courts, see supra note 30.
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claim will likely attempt to characterize its action as one for cost recovery,
thereby adding to the confusion.69
As a result of these inconsistent holdings, PRPs, as well as other parties
required to assist in a cleanup of a CERCLA site, will be subject to substantial
uncertainty with regard to their respective liability for cleanup-associated costs.
Furthermore, parties will be reluctant to settle if they cannot be assured in-
demnity from further liability. These varied holdings frustrate the very struc-
ture of CERCLA. Instead of encouraging quick settlements, parties will proba-
bly wait until other PRPs are identified before seriously considering a settle-
ment. By holding out until the last minute, PRPs will be better able to gauge
their potential exposure based on the number, solvency, and other attributes of
additional exposed PRPs.
II. AVAILABILITY OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT JuDICIAL REVIEW OF AN EPA
COMPLIANCE ORDER UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
LAGUNA GATUNA, INC. V. BROWNER70
A. Background
1. Statutory Background
The Federal Water Pollution and Control Act, commonly referred to as
the Clean Water Act (CWA), broadly aims to preserve the quality of the Unit-
ed States' waters.7 Its provisions impose responsibilities on entities whose
actions may harm water" and provide the federal government enforcement
authority to stop acts harmful to the integrity of the water.73 The CWA's ex-
pansive jurisdictional provisions encompass bodies of water ranging from
navigable waterways to "wet meadows."7 Two enforcement methods specifi-
cally afforded to the EPA are the power to bring a civil suit against an offend-
er and the power to issue a compliance order.75 Should the EPA unilaterally
find that a violator has failed to obey a compliance order, it may elect to bring
suit to enforce its order,76 but it incurs no obligation.77
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective ... is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1344(f)(2) (1994) (requiring permit for "discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters"); Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter,
Environmental Law, 1992 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1187, 1194-95 (1993).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1994) (requiring the EPA to "issue an order requiring ... [com-
pliance] or ... [to] bring a civil action"); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (authorizing a "civil action for
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction").
74. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1995). As a result, the parties that may be subject to a CWA action
can be similarly diverse.
75. 33 U.S.C § 1319(a)(6)(b); Andrew I. Davis, Comment, Judicial Review of Environmental
Compliance Orders, 24 ENVTL. L. 189, 189-90 (1994). A compliance order must be served on the
violator, must explain the nature of the violation, and must specifically provide a deadline for
completion. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(A).
76. 33 U.S.C § 1319(b). For a general discussion of how a potential defendant responds to
an impending suit, see Symposium, Responding to a Government Environmental Investigation:
Shaping the Defense, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 509 (1992).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). Courts have unanimously interpreted this provision to preclude
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Administrative orders issued by federal agencies (such as EPA compliance
orders) are governed by both the agency's enabling legislation and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA).7 s Under the APA, a final agency action is
generally presumed reviewable provided the party bringing the action has
standing and meets other prudential requirements such as ripeness.79 The
APA rarely allows de novo review and normally commands a higher standard
for judicial review of administrative orders.8"
2. Case Law Background
Courts must presume that final agency actions are reviewable."s This pre-
sumption is rebuttable by strong, persuasive, or clear and convincing evidence
of legislative intent to preclude judicial review.8 2 Despite this apparently nar-
row exception allowing preclusion of review, courts which have heard cases
asking for judicial review of compliance orders prior to EPA enforcement
have unanimously refused review.83 Because of this interpretation of the
EPA's permissible enforcement provision, parties who receive compliance
orders find themselves in a difficult dilemma. A party served with a compli-
ance order must either comply or risk incurring penalties if it fails to comply.
The party may not invoke judicial review until the EPA seeks enforcement.84
Three cases provide a foundation for analysis: Southern Pines Associa-
tions v. United States,85 Rueth v. EPA,' and Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Of-
fice of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement.7 Southern Pines in-
volved an EPA compliance order prohibiting Southern Pines from dumping in
judicial review of the compliance order before the EPA seeks enforcement. See infra notes 120-28
and accompanying text.
Many commentators believe that precluding pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA com-
pliance orders is not only unfair, but in conflict with both current Supreme Court precedent and
express congressional intent (notwithstanding the cases discussed infra). For a thorough and co-
gent argument of why pre-enforcement judicial review should be allowed, see Davis, supra note
75.
78. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994) [hereinafter APA];
David M. Moore, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders to Abate Environ-
mental Hazards, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).
79. APA §§ 702, 704; JOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 533-34 (1995); Davis, supra
note 75, at 194-95; Moore, supra note 78, at 681.
80. APA § 706; see ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 543-
44 (1992). The primary standard for review is whether an agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
but other sources of jurisdiction exist including federal questions, ultra vires actions, etc. Id.
81. APA § 702; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). For an in-depth analysis
and critique of environmental statutes and their judicial review, see Edward W. Warren & Gary E.
Marchant, "More Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Review-
ing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379 (1993).
82. See APA §§ 701(a)(1), 706; Davis, supra note 75, at 196-97; Moore, supra note 78, at
684-85.
83. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement,
20 F.3d 1418, 1426-27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227,
231 (7th Cir. 1993); Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990);
Davis, supra note 75, at 190; Moore, supra note 78, at 690-96 (addressing reviewability under
CERCLA).
84. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
85. 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990).
86. 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
87. 20 F.3d 1418 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
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certain Virginia wetlands." Southern Pines had previously filed an action for
both declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to avoid compliance on the
grounds that the EPA lacked jurisdiction over the dumping site.89 The district
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'
To reach its decision, the court examined the legislative history of the
CWA9' and pointed out the similarities in structure92 and enforcement provi-
sions93 that the CWA shares with the Clean Air Act (CAA)94 and
CERCLA.95 The court concluded that Congress envisioned an EPA that could
respond to environmental crises quickly and efficiently without being subject
to immediate, debilitating, and time-consuming litigation.' Therefore, the
EPA compliance orders governed by the CWA (and likely the CAA and
CERCLA) were not intended to receive judicial review."
In Rueth, the second leading case in this area, the EPA issued a compli-
ance order to cease dumping into a wetland, and to begin restoration of the
area.9" Rueth filed an action for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment,
alleging that the EPA did not have jurisdiction over the wetland at issue."
The district court dismissed for its own lack of jurisdiction."° The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, concluding that EPA compliance orders are not reviewable
until the agency seeks to enforce them.' The circuit court adopted the rea-
soning of the district court and indicated that the CWA expressly provides for
judicial review at the enforcement stage, thereby precluding review before that
time. 2
A third significant case involving pre-enforcement judicial review of an
EPA compliance order, Southern Ohio Coal,"0 successfully challenged an
EPA threat to issue a compliance order in district court.' On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the holdings of both Southern Pines and
Rueth by stating that Congress had not intended to allow judicial review of
EPA compliance orders.
88. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 714.
89. Id. Southern Pines advanced an additional theory in support of its claim, alleging that the
EPA's order constituted an actual controversy under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994). Id.
90. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 717.
91. Id. at 716.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). Courts have viewed the CAA and CERCLA as sharing
similar legislative histories with regard to legislative intent towards judicial reviewability of EPA
compliance orders. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565; Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1426; South-
ern Pines, 912 F.2d at 716.
96. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 716.
97. Id.
98. Rueth, 13 F.3d at 228.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 230-31.
102. Id. at 229 (citing Rueth Dev. Co. v. EPA, No. CIV.A.H91-152, 1992 WL 560944, at *5
(N.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 1992)).
103. 20 F.3d 1418 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
104. Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1422.
105. Id. at 1426. The Southern Ohio Coal court endorsed both the Fourth and Seventh
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B. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner"°
1. Facts
In 1987, Laguna Gatuna's "predecessor in interest" asked the EPA if a
sinkhole on its land was considered water subject to EPA jurisdiction. 7 The
EPA responded in the negative." In 1991, the EPA discovered dead migra-
tory birds in the vicinity of the sinkhole and issued a compliance order the fol-
lowing year, which prohibited Laguna Gatuna from further dumping into the
sinkhole." Laguna Gatuna complied with the order." '
2. Decision
After Laguna Gatuna sought declaratory relief in federal district court
asserting that the EPA did not have jurisdiction to issue the compliance order,
the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction." On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the same ground."2
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit found that the issue of pre-enforcement judicial review-
ability of EPA compliance orders under the CWA was one of first impression
in the circuit.' It qualified this statement, however, by indicating that other
circuits had uniformly dealt with the issue and that it would follow their
Circuit's holdings, even though both circuits used different rationales to reach their respective
conclusions. Compare Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 715 (using statutory structure and legislative
history and intent to reach its holding) with Rueth, 13 F.3d at 229-31 (analyzing both legislative
intent and the express wording of the CWA to make its decision) and Hoffman Group, Inc. v.
EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on CWA statutory language to reach its holding).
The Southern Ohio Coal court further stated, "Congress provided one forum in which to
address all issues, including constitutional challenges, raised by the issuance of a[n EPA] compli-
ance order: an enforcement proceeding." Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1426. Therefore, judicial
review of an order after an enforcement proceeding is constitutionally mandated. Until the en-
forcement proceeding actually occurs, however, review is neither available nor constitutionally
required. Id. at 1427.
106. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
107. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
108. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations includes in its definition of "waters of the United
States":
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands," sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters ....
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) iden-
tified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this definition.
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1995). Wetlands are further defined as "those areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." Id.
109. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 564, 566.
113. Id. at 565.
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lead."4 The court then dismissed the arguments put forth by Laguna
Gatuna. "
In reaching its decision, the court followed the reasoning of the three
leading cases discussed above." 6 In short order, it cited Southern Pines,
Rueth, and Southern Ohio Coal, and presented a brief summary of each case's
facts, holding, and rationale." 7 Concluding that the reasoning from these oth-
er jurisdictions was sound, the Laguna Gatuna court announced that it would
follow them."'
Thus, the Tenth Circuit established that pre-enforcement judicial review of
an EPA compliance order under the CWA is unavailable on two bases: legisla-
tive intent and the constitutional requirement that judicial review occur after a
party seeks actual enforcement of a compliance order."9
D. Other Circuits
As discussed previously, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
have all prohibited pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA compliance orders
under the CWA.2 ° The remaining circuits have not yet addressed this issue
as it relates to the CWA.'2' It appears, though, that given the three leading
114. Id. The court cited Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d 1418; Rueth, 13 F.3d 227; and South-
ern Pines, 912 F.2d 713 as persuasive authority for its dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Laguna
Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
115. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565. Laguna Gatuna unsuccessfully argued that Rueth, South-
ern Ohio Coal, and Southern Pines were distinguishable. Laguna cited Riverside Irrigation Dist. v.
Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981) as binding authority, but the court found the case to be fac-
tually distinguishable. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565. Laguna Gatuna also failed to convince the
court that parties should not be forced to expose themselves to fines or penalties to receive judi-
cial review. Id. Even though Laguna Gatuna put forth such a "strong due process argument(]," the
court indicated that preclusion of judicial review of an EPA compliance order nonetheless passed
constitutional muster. Id. at 565.
In its petition for certiorari, Laguna Gatuna attempted to distinguish its facts, insisting that
the sinkhole was not a playa lake, was hydrologically isolated, and could not fall within the defi-
nition of "waters of the U.S." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner,
58 F.3d 564 (10th Cit. 1995) (No. 95-465), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996). Laguna Gatuna's
attorney insisted that although the area received abnormally high rainfall the year the dead birds
were found, water never stood in the sinkhole. Telephone interview with Todd Welch, Attorney
for Petitioner, Mountain States Legal Foundation (Dec. 3, 1995). He asserted, therefore, that the
sinkhole could not be defined as water of the U.S. Id. Furthermore, Laguna Gatuna's counsel ar-
gued that any discharges emanating from the sinkhole were ten times cleaner than natural dis-
charges. Id.
116. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565-66.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 566.
119. The court did not expressly state that pre-enforcement judicial review of an EPA order
under the CAA or CERCLA is not available, but the similarities of the three statutes indicate that
the legislative intent argument holds for all three statutes. See discussion supra, text accompanying
notes 92-96. The constitutional due process argument, presumably, rings true for all three statutes.
120. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d 713; Southern Ohio Oil, 20 F.3d 1418; Rueth, 13 F.3d 227;
Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d 564.
121. Two district courts have also issued opinions consistent with the conclusions of the four
circuits discussed above. See Child v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1536 (D. Utah 1994)
(concluding that the "CWA precludes review of... pre-enforcement action[s]"); Howell v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 794 F. Supp. 1072, 1074-75 (D.N.M. 1992) (applying Southern
Pines even though the acting entity under the CWA was the Army Corps of Engineers rather than
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cases as well as Laguna Gatuna this issue is now settled.
The Third Circuit, in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 2 2 supported this
trend. It held that, within the context of the CAA, pre-enforcement judicial
review of an EPA compliance order is specifically precluded by the statute
itself' 23 Also within the context of the CAA, the Eighth Circuit addressed
the issue in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA.'2' Lloyd A. Fry upheld the
district court's finding of want of jurisdiction.'25 The CAA's legislative his-
tory indicated a pre-enforcement bar against judicial review notwithstanding
the absence of an express prohibition.'26 The court stated that such review
would be inconsistent with the CAA's enforcement provisions.'27
The prevailing trend therefore establishes that an EPA compliance order is
not subject to judicial review until after an enforcement action has begun.
Parties who receive compliance orders must either comply or risk incurring
penalties that the party may not challenge unless and until the EPA decides it
wishes to enforce its order. 2 '
CONCLUSION
These two cases represent two drastically different approaches that courts
may take when interpreting environmental statutes. On one hand, the Tenth
Circuit has caused substantial uncertainty with its interpretation of CERCLA's
cost recovery and contribution provisions. By addressing the questions present-
ed in Colorado & Eastern narrowly, the partial answers provided not only
differ from the law of other circuits, but give rise to more questions that will
surely require answers in the future. Until the court addresses these questions,
parties potentially involved in CERCLA situations will be subject to substan-
tial risk and uncertainty.
On the other hand, Laguna Gatuna, has helped to increase certainty and
consistency by adding to a legal foundation shared by environmental law and
administrative law. By following three other circuits in its holding and dis-
missing constitutional due process arguments, the Tenth Circuit has endorsed
Congress's apparent intent that pre-enforcement judicial review of an EPA
compliance order shall not occur.
Cameron R. Getto
the EPA).
122. 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
123. Getty Oil Co., 467 F.2d at 356.
124. 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977).
125. Lloyd A. Fry, 554 F.2d at 892.
126. Id. at 890.
127. Id. at 890-91.
128. See supra note 77.
19961

